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Abstract of the paper 
 
 
This paper is a quantitative study of the genocide in the prefecture of Kibuye in Rwanda in 1994. We use an 
original data base developed by the organisation of the survivors of the genocide (IBUKA) who collected the 
data by house-to-house fieldwork. The data contain information on the age, sex, commune of residence before 
the genocide, the professional occupation of the victims, the place and date of death and the weapon used to kill, 
for a total of 59.050 victims of genocide. For one commune (Mabanza), we re-coded the data, present detailed 
statistics and perform an analysis of survival chances. From the analysis, we derive that Tutsi from the sectors 
of Mabanza commune whose Tutsi population did not (or only in limited numbers) go to the Gatwaro Stadium 
had a better chance to survive the genocide in Kibuye. For the whole of the prefecture, we present an estimation 
of the daily killing rate, estimations of the number of Tutsi killed in the major massacres and the weapons 
used. For over 25.000 victims for which the data file has complete information, we present a logistical regression 
explaining the use of either a traditional weapon or a fire-arm. The analysis shows that the probability to be 
killed with a fire-arm depended on the commune of residence of the victim, the age of the victim, the number of 
days after April 6 the victim was killed and on interaction effects between the latter two variables and the sex 
of the victim.  
 
 
* The author is a research sc holar from the Fund of Scientific Research (Flanders, Belgium). The author owes 
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data file. It is worth emphasizing that the author can use the file without restrictions. Academic freedom in the 
use of the data file for the analysis of the genocide were unconditional. I am indebted to L.Berlage, S.Cook, 
S.Dercon, A.Desforges, W.Seltzer, and seminar participants in the Genocide Studies Seminar at Yale University 
for insightful and critical comments to a draft version of this paper. I am grateful to F. for the skillful editing of 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to African Rights, the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture was the most thorough 
genocide of all the prefectures in Rwanda (African Rights, 1995, p. 394). Locked in between 
the Prefectures of Gisenyi in the north, Gitarama in the east, Cyangugu in the south and Lake 
Kivu in the west, the Tutsi from Kibuye had nowhere to flee. They were left at the mercy of 
their killers. The latter wanted to kill every man, woman and child known as Tutsi in their 
communes. Knowing that they could only count upon themselves, a large number of Tutsi, 
estimated in this paper at almost one quarter of all Tutsi who were killed in Kibuye Prefecture, 
mounted a strong resistance against the forces of genocide. In Bisesero, a mountainous area in 
Gishyita commune, these Tutsi succeeded in defending themselves for more than a month 
after the start of the genocide. One of the findings of this paper is that the fate of the Bisesero 
Tutsi was unlike the fate of all other Tutsi in the prefecture. As I shall document in the paper, 
seventy-five percent of the Tutsi from Kibuye were killed before the end of April 1994, the 
Tutsi of Bisesero forming the main exception.  
 
The analysis presented in this paper is a statistical study of the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. 
The main purpose of the study is to use diverse statistical tools to document the genocide, to 
show its mechanisms, its brutality and above all, its speed. Section two gives a brief profile and 
a map of the prefecture. Section three presents the main data file used for this study and a 
general overview of population figures. I discuss the shortcomings of the data file. In section 
four, I present analysis of survival chances for one commune. Section five presents an 
estimation of killing over time, which may be the main contribution of the paper. In order to 
keep the text readable, numerous computations are put in the appendix. I estimate mortality 
figures throughout the three months of the genocide in Kibuye in general and Bisesero in 
particular. Section six extrapolates figures from Kibuye together with other prefectures to 
Rwanda as a whole. In part seven, I do a detailed study of the use of firearms in the genocide 
in Kibuye. Part eight compares the results of the statistical analysis with documents written by 
the perpetrators of genocide and section nine concludes.  
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2. PROFILE OF THE PREFECTURE 
 
 
2.1. Neglect and Interest 
 
The Prefecture of Kibuye is situated in the west of Rwanda bordering the Kivu Lake in the 
west, the Prefecture of Gitarama in the east and the Prefecture of Gisenyi in the north. Before 
the genocide, there was no paved road linking the prefecture with other prefectures or with 
the capital Kigali. Kibuye was and is one of the poorest prefectures of Rwanda. In terms of 
per capita income, Butare and Gikongoro are poorer, but Kibuye was the least integrated in 
the Rwandan economy, as a result of the lack of transport infrastructure and the geographical 
location of the prefecture. Jobs giving access to off-farm income were in short supply. This 
means that the population lived by virtue of its soil, its cattle and its small intra-prefecture 
trade, even more than in other prefectures. There was trade with Zaire, especially in cattle 
products, but it remained small-scale trade. The main reason for the neglect of the prefecture 
by the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes was the absence of political representation from 
the prefecture at the  highest level of government. Kayibanda favored Gitarama and 
Habyarimana favored Gisenyi. After Butare Prefecture, Kibuye counted the largest Tutsi 
population of Rwanda.  
 
The tea-plantations and tea-factory in Gisovu Commune were the only object of interest for 
the Habyarimana regime. The plantation and the factory were managed by Ocir-thé and 
directed by Alfred Musema, member of the Akazu. Since Rwanda only had six tea-plantations, 
the Gisovu plantation was of considerable importance for export earnings. With the decline in 
the price of coffee at the end of the eighties, an increase in tea production and tea export 
became an important objective for the Habyarimana government. The local peasant 
population was very hostile to the establishment of the tea-plantation since their land was 
expropriated. The peasant families had to move to other, less fertile land or even migrate
1.  All 
but one of the tea-plantations was state-owned. The value of tea production to the regime 
became clear in the event of war. In January 1994, Human Rights Watch writes that Rwanda 
bought a huge quantity of arms in exchange for 1 million US$ in cash together with the future 
tea harvest from the Mulindi tea plantation
2. As in the case of Mulindi, the Gisovu plantation 
and factory were state-owned. Most of the tea producing facilities were financed by donor 
agencies, making the tea industry, and more specifically its high operating costs, a good 
                                                 
1
  Bart., F., Montagnes d ‘Afrique, terres Paysannes : Le cas du Rwanda, 1993, p. 456. 









2.2. Map of the prefecture 
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Communes of Kibuye 
(Ru) Rutsiro; (Ma) Mabanza; (Ki) Kivumu; (Git) Gitesi; (Mw) Mwendo; (Go) Gisovu ; 
(Git) Gitesi ; (Gy) Gishyita ; (Rw) Rwamatamu 
 
* Bisesero sector in Gishyita commune 
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  I refer to P. Uvin’s book on development aid and its relation with the genocide for a general discussion of 
rent-seeking in Rwanda and many examples.  
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3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
3.1. The method used by IBUKA 
 
The organization of the survivors of the genocide, named IBUKA, has undertaken a large 
research project with the main objective of finding all the names of the victims of the 
genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. They proceeded alongside the administrative organisation of 
Rwandan society. Kibuye Prefecture is divided into nine communes. Each commune, having 
on average 50.000 inhabitants, is subdivided into several sectors. These sectors on their turn 
consist of several cells. Commune by commune, sector by sector and cell by cell, IBUKA 
collaborators went into all families of Tutsi survivors and of Hutu who did not participate in 
the genocide to find the names of the murdered Tutsi. The project was financed by the Dutch 
Embassy in Rwanda and employed about two hundred enumerators. The enumerators came 
from the commune where they were doing the interviews or were familiar with it. The 
majority of the enumerators had high school training behind them. It was not easy for IBUKA 
to find experienced enumerators, since almost all educated Tutsi were killed. This lack of 
experience, together with the choice of IBUKA to work only with survivors as enumerators, 
had a negative effect on the quality of the data collection process in some communes. There 
was one supervisor for each commune who was monitoring the work of about 20 
enumerators, at least one enumerator per sector. The enumerators and supervisors did not 
receive any statistical or interview training. The result is a nominative dictionary with the 
names of almost 60.000 victims of genocide of the prefecture published in December 1999. 
The project also registered whenever possible, the age and the profession of the victim, the 
place where the person was killed and the weapon that was used. The present paper uses the 
IBUKA data file to analyze the statistics of genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. It is worth 
emphasizing that the data file was not constructed for statistical purposes, but for the nominal 
documentation of genocide victims in Kibuye. The latter objective remains the prime value of 
the documentation project. Given the death toll among Tutsi, the very difficult living 
conditions after the genocide, the lack of training and adequate research facilities, the result of 
the project is all the more remarkable.  
 
It follows that the use of the data file for statistical purposes is problematic. Firstly, the author 




substantially between communes and sectors. These problems should be clear from the outset 
of the paper. I tried to tackle them on several fronts: I did personal interviews of the 
enumerators and the supervisors of the data collection process and I applied statistical 
methods to correct for missing data. Since the enumerators were all survivors of the genocide 
in Kibuye Prefecture, it is possible that the number of victims was inflated or that respondents 
made up stories to satisfy the enumerators. From my interviews, I retain that most of the 
respondents were Hutu, who have, I believe, no incentive to inflate victim figures (on the 
contrary one would say). One also has the impression that Hutu who did not participate in the 
genocide feel a need to come forward with accurate information to clear themselves of guilt. 
This is important if one wants to avoid a whole ethnic group becoming identified with the 
perpetrator image. Some of the respondents indeed identified more with the survivors of the 
genocide then with the perpetrators. This is especially the case for Hutu widows of Tutsi 
husbands. In the event where data were doubtful, I decided not to use them. This is the case 
for the many victims whose date of death is not registered, but for whom the weapon used to 
kill the victim is nevertheless indicated. This seems strange and for these victims I did not use 
the data on the weapon in my analysis of weapons used to kill (I refer to section 3.4 for this).
4 
The organizers of the data collection process also intended to register the 'cause' of the death 
of a person. The different categories that were mentioned for the 'cause ' of death in the 
registration books are: being Tutsi, being a Tutsi-friend, having a Tutsi physical look, political 
opposition, having a Tutsi mother. However, 98% of the entries indicate the first possibility, 
meaning that this part of the data collection failed :
5 IBUKA has only registered the Tutsi 
victims of genocide and did not, or only sporadically, register persons who were killed for 
other reasons than being Tutsi.
6 
 
The published Nominal Dictionary gives the names of the victims of the genocide in Kibuye 
Prefecture. Looking at the original books that were used to collect the data however, I learned 
that information on the surviving members of each household was also collected (but not 
                                                 
4   I owe this remark to Alison Desforges. The distribution of all weapons used in the genocide (% for each 
weapon) however does not change very much when one includes these cases.  
5   This is problematic, because it means that the IBUKA data file only contains Tutsi among the registered 
victims and not for example the Hutu widows of Tutsi husbands. The author could not verify the 
magnitude of interethnic marriage in Kibuye, which maybe sizeable, but should not be overestimated either. 
6   It is interesting to see that the Government of Rwanda used the IBUKA scheme to make a national census 
of genocide victims in August 2000. Results of this national data collection process are not yet known at the 
time of writing.  
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published). This additional information can give empirical insight into the execution of 
genocide. The information on the survivors also deals with age, sex, profession and area of 
residence, comparable to those of the victims.  
 
As with the victims, the quality of the data differs substantially between communes and 
sectors. Since the data on the survivors was not computerized, I decided to make a new 
database with victims AND survivors. In that respect I could also code the responses in a way 
that make the data more suitable for statistical analysis. Budget limitations allowed me only to 
organize the re-coding of one entire commune (Mabanza) and of half of the sectors of 
another commune (Gitesi). Needless to say,  it would be interesting to re-code the remaining 
communes too. In some communes however, the benefit of re-coding would be small, 
because the data are bad, whereas in other communes the benefit would be great. In general, 
one cannot overcome the missing data problem. For some sectors of Gitesi for example, 
enumerators did not enlist ages or dates or professions of the victims nor of survivors. In that 
case, it makes no sense to re-code data. I decided nevertheless to re-code some sectors of 
Gitesi commune in order to learn as much as possible on the genocide in this commune. We 
come back to this in section four of the paper (see also appendix 2). 
 
Table 1: Quality of the data collection process 
 
Commune  ages  dates  places  survivors  re-coding worthwhile 
Bwakira  +  -  +/-  +  yes 
Gishyita  +  +  +  +  yes 
Gisovu  +  +  -  -  no 
Gitesi  +  -  -  -  partly 
Kivumu  +  +  +/-  +/-  partly 
Mabanza  +  +/-  +  +  yes 
Mwendo  +  +/-  +/-  +  yes 
Rutsiro  +  -  -  -  no 
Rwamatamu  +  +  +  +  yes 
 
data is good (+), data is average (+/-) or data is bad (-) where ‘good’ means that for most victims (or 
survivors) the data on that item were indeed collected. ‘bad’ meaning that data were not collected (missing) and 





As one can see, the quality of the data for Gitesi, Gisovu and Rutsiro communes is particularly 
poor. Gitesi commune in particular is an example of poor fieldwork. 
 
I did not have access to the raw data of the 1991 census in Rwanda; tool demographers 
normally use it to analyze excess mortality. The present data file only contains data on the 
Tutsis who were killed during the genocide. The IBUKA project succeeded in finding 59.050 
victims of genocide in Kibuye Prefecture, meaning 12 % (59.050 of 500.000) of the 
population of that prefecture. Table 2 presents the general figures. The figure of 59.050 is an 




3.2. General Figures of Genocide in Kibuye Prefecture 
 
Table 2: General figures of genocide in Kibuye Prefecture 
 
  Number*  Percent 
Total population of the Prefecture in 1991   473.920  100 
Population registered as Hutu  399.470  84,3 
Population registered as Tutsi  71.225  15,0 
Population registered as Twa  1.490  0,3 
Foreign, other or undetermined  1.735  0,3 
Murdered population found by IBUKA  59.050  12,4 
 
  Number  % of Tutsi** 
Tutsi population registered as murdered  59.050  82,9 
Tutsi population not registered as murdered  12.175  17,1 
*  I have no access to exact figures of the population size in March 1994. Total population in the prefecture 
probably reached 500.000 (@473.920*(1.03)2) by March 1994.  
**  Accounting for population growth, the figures become 78% registered as murdered and 22% not registered. 
 
According to the 1991 census and the figures found by IBUKA, 12,4% of the population of 
Kibuye Prefecture was killed in the genocide, meaning approx. 80% of the Tutsi population. 
This means that 15 to 20% of Tutsi,  (between 10.000 and 15.000 persons) survived the 
genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. Table 3 provides information on the genocide in each of the 




Since I did not have access to the 1991 population figures according to ethnic affiliation by 
commune, I cannot determine exactly how many Tutsi survived the genocide in each of the 
communes. Apart from this, the IBUKA data file gives a lot of other information that one 
would normally not find in census data. Since the file has, among other information, the dates 
and places of the massacres and the weapons used in the massacres, it is an unique source of 
information for the study of the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. 
 
Table 3: Victims of genocide by commune* 
 
Commune   Number of inhabitants  Number of victims  % of population 
  1991*  data file  killed** 
Bwakira   53.555  4.674  8,7 
Gishyita  43.090  11.273  26,1 
Gisovu   39.365  3.003  7,6 
Gitesi  61.341  11.118  18,1 
Kivumu  55.361  3.934  7,1 
Mabanza  63.460  8.782  13,8 
Mwendo  43.632  4472  10,2 
Rutsiro  56.768  941  1,6 
Rwamatamu   54.494  10.853  20,0 
Total***  471.066  59.050  12,5 
*  I did not have access to 1991 census data on ethnic affiliation per commune. 
**  To be lowered by 0.5% when population growth between 1991 and 1994 is taken into account. 
 
 
3.3. Distribution of killing through time with untreated data 
 
IBUKA found 59.050 victims of genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. The dates on which these 
victims were killed are known for 25.716 persons, or in 43% of the cases. Table 4 lists the 
number of victims by commune as well as the number of victims whose dates of death are 
known. One can see that Gishyita, Rwamatamu and Gitesi count the largest number of 
victims; this is directly related to the high number of Tutsi living in these communes before 
the genocide. The number of victims with known dates of death is unequally distributed over 
the communes. We know the dates of almost all victims in Rwamatamu and Kivumu 
communes, but we know very few dates in Rutsiro commune and Gitesi commune. In the 





Table 4: Victims per commune and date of death known 
 
Commune  Number of victims   Number of victims of whom  in % 
  in the data file  date of death is registered 
Bwakira  4.674  1.381  29,5 
Gishyita  11.273  4.221  37,4 
Gisovu  3.003  1.640  54,6 
Gitesi  11.118  135  0,01 
Kivumu  3.934  3.265  82,9 
Mabanza  8.782  3.566  40,6 
Mwendo  4.472  2.028  45,3 
Rutsiro  941  199  21,1 
Rwamatamu  10.853  9.284  85,5 
Total  59.050  25.716  43,5 
 
 
Figure 1: Victims of Genocide in Kibuye Prefecture 










































Figure 1 shows that the majority of  Tutsi from Kibuye were killed in the first two weeks of 
the genocide. Later on (section five) we will go into more detail about the possible bias in this 




3.4. The weapons used 
 
Table 5: Weapons used to kill Tutsi (all ages) with number of victims for each weapon 
 
  Entire file  Dates of death known 
Weapon  Number  Percentage  Number  percentage 
Machete  31.117  52,8  13.272  51.6 
Club  9.779  16,6  4238  16.5 
Gun, rifle  8.706  14,7  4575  17.8 
Grenade  1.058  1,8  609  2.4 
Drowned  847  1,4  486  1.9 
Hoe, hack  444  0,8  328  1.3 
Buried alive  442  0,7  340  1.3 
Latrines  437  0,7  150  0.6 
Spear  421  0,7  209  0.8 
Burnt alive  401  0,7  226  0.9 
Pick-axe  337  0,6  192  0.7 
Stone1  31  0,2  84  0.3 
Hanged  100  0,2  35  0.1 
Sword  79  0,1  50  0.2 
Starvation  23  0,0  15  0.1 
Tractor  12  0,0  7  0.0 
Other  636  1,1  197  0.8 
Unknown or missing   4.020  6,8  659  2.6 
 
Total  59.050  100  25.719  100 
 
 
Table 5 is a good example of one of the data problems. The weapon that was used to kill the 
victim is 'known' in 92% of the cases. The date of death however is only known for 43% of 
the victims. It seems highly unlikely that a witness remembers the weapon that was used to kill 
a person but cannot recall the date the event occurred. Of all the tables in this paper, table 5 
best documents the brutality of the genocide. Most victims were hacked to death with 
traditional weapons such as a machete or a club. We do notice however the importance of 
firearms, being the gun or rifle and the grenade. From the 25.719 victims whose date of death 
is registered in the data file, 20,2% were killed by a firearm (gun, rifle or grenade). In section 7, 





4. ANALYSIS OF SURVIVAL CHANCES 
 
 
During the fieldwork by IBUKA data on survivors in some communes were registered, but 
not computerized. Because of budgetary limitations, I could only computerize data for two 
communes. I decided to focus on the genocide in the center of Kibuye. Therefore, the data on 
the survivors from Mabanza and Gitesi communes was computerized.  The fact that 
computer work for survivors had to be done, was used to re-code data of victims. The quality 
of the data for Mabanza commune made this a worthwhile investment. Data on places of 
death in Mabanza commune were computerized, but were not suitable for statistical analysis. 
Names of places e.g. were spelled out instead of numbered. This section will deal with 
Mabanza commune. Data and analysis for Gitesi are presented in appendix 2. Other 
communes where re-entry of the data would be worthwhile (but has not yet been performed) 
are Bwakira, Gishyita and Rwamatamu. Entry of survivor data and re-coding could specifically 
teach us something about survival chances in these communes. I will now present an analysis 
of survival chances for Mabanza commune. The underlying database is named ‘the new 
database’ to distinguish it from the IBUKA nominal database.  
 
Table 6: Death and survival in Mabanza commune 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Total number of inhabitants registered in the 1991 census  63.460 
Total number in 1994 (1991 figure * (1.03)
2)   67.325 
Total number of Tutsi registered in new database  10.785 
Total number of victims   9.257 
Total number of survivors  1.477 
Number of people without entry   51 
Percentage of 1994 inhabitants killed  13,7% 
Percentage of Tutsi in new database killed   86,2% 
Percentage of Tutsi in new database survived  13,8% 
 
After re-entry of the data for Mabanza commune, I found 9.257 Tutsi killed and 1.477 Tutsi 
who survived the genocide. This means that we have about 86% of the registered Tutsi in 
Mabanza commune killed in the genocide. This is 13,7% of the resident population. The fact  
 
13
that I have 500 victims more in the re-coded data file compared to the IBUKA publication is 
because after that publication, more names of victims were found
7. 
 
Table 6.2: Places where the Tutsi residents of Mabanza were killed 
Name or Location  Number of victims  % of victims 
In the cell of residence   1.905  20,5 
In another cell within the sector  836  9 
In another sector within the commune  329  3,5 
In the Gatwaro Stadium  3.359  36,2 
In Nyamagumba  677  7,3 
In Bisesero
8  300  3,2 
In the Kivu Lake  18  0,2 
At any another place  645  10,0 
At an unknown place  1.188  12,8 
Total  9.257  100 
Total-unknown place  8.069  87,1 
 
Table 6.2 gives a geographic insight in the genocide in Mabanza commune. We can see that 
about 20% of the victims (and 25% of those for which that place is known) were killed in 
their own cell of residence. Since we have no figures for other communes, it is difficult to 
compare. We know however that more than 1 out of 3 victims (36.2%) in Mabanza commune 
were killed in the Gatwaro Stadium. Since this percentage is very high, we expect that in other 
communes, more than 20% of the victims may have been killed in their own cell. In Figure 2, 
we also observe between-sector variation in Mabanza commune: two sectors in Mabanza 
commune, Kibirira and Nyagatovu, have more than 50% of all the victims residing in that 
sector (respectively 287 and 499) killed in their own cell. Not surprisingly, these sectors have 
very few residents who were killed in the Gatwaro Stadium. Kibingo sector has more then half 
of its victims killed in Nyamagumba. The latter place is the name given by the perpetrators of 
genocide to a hill in Kibingo sector. The name is the same name as that of a hill in Ruhengeri 
Prefecture where Tutsi were killed in 1963-1964
9. Tutsi from the northern sectors (Kibingo 
and neighboring sectors) of Mabanza commune did not gather at the communal office, took 
                                                 
7  Author’s communication with IBUKA, Kigali, August 2000. 
8  'Bisesero' means the hills of Bisesero (plural). 




refuge at ' Nyamagumba ' and resisted the Interahamwe and the soldiers from April 9 to April 
12. 
 
Figure 2 : Residence specific survival chances in Mabanza commune 
SECTOR


























Legend:  Buhinga 1,Gacaca 2, Gihara 3, Gitwa 4, Kibirira 5, Kigeyo 6, Kibingo 7, Mushubati 9, Nyagatovu 11, Nyarugenge 
12, Rubengera 13, Rukaragara 14. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows Gihara sector to be the most deadly sector, only 5% of the resident Tutsi 
population survived. Gihara sector has two cells where all Tutsi were killed. This is also the 
case for three cells in Gitwa sector and one cell in Rukaragara sector. Sectors Mukura (8) and 
Ngoma (10) are left out of the graph because very few Tutsi lived in these sectors. In two cells 
in Mukura sector, all Tutsi were killed. There are cells with a lot of Tutsi where more then 
90% of them were killed. On average, as we have seen, 86% of all Tutsi in Mabanza commune 
were killed.
10 A Tutsi had the highest survival chance, on average, when she or he resided in 
Gacaca sector or Kibirira sector, respectively 24.5% and 30% of the Tutsi population in these 
sectors survived. One cell in Kibingo sector, with a relatively high number of Tutsi, had the 
highest survival percentage in Mabanza, namely 58%.  
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   Among the 1.477 survivors, we counted 123 soldiers. The latter  have been left out of the subsequent 




One important question one can try to answer with the geographical data is whether or not 
one’s survival chances depended on the place of refuge. For this purpose we constructed a 
specific table (Table 6.3) with the overall survival percentage for each sector together with the 




Table 6.3: General survival chances and death in the Gatwaro Stadium 
 
Sector  % survived  Gatwaro Stadium 
  genocide  % killed   number killed 
 
Buhinga  8.6  62.8  615 
Gacaca  24.5  54.5  192 
Gihara  5.0  66.9  477 
Gitwa  15.7  55.4  149 
Kibirira  30.0  26.2  124 
Kigeyo  7.4  67.1  753 
Kibingo  22.3  2.3  22 
Mushubati  14.9  47.9  444 
Nyaragatovu  12.8  3.6  32 
Nyarugenge  7.6  48.8  185 
Rubengera  10.4  59.1  331 
Rukaragara  6.5  8.5  35 
 
Total  13.8  36.2  3.359 
 
We then make two groups from the 12 sectors (Mukura and Ngoma have few victims to do 
the analysis with and are left out). The first group includes those sectors of which less then 
50% of its victims died in the Gatwaro Stadium, the second group includes the sectors of 
which more than 50% of its victims died in the Gatwaro Stadium.  
 
Group 1 : Buhinga, Gacaca, Gihara, Gitwa, Kigeyo and Rubengera 
Group 2 : Kibirira, Kibingo, Mushubati, Nyaragatovu, Nyarugenge and Rukaragara 
 
On average, 20.9% of the victims in the first group died in the Gatwaro Stadium, compared to 
63.3% for the second group. We then compute survival chances for each group and test 
whether they are significantly different for both groups in Table 6.4 
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   I decided to pursue more detailed work on (differences in) survival chances thanks to an insightful 





Table 6.4: Survival chances in two different groups 
 
Killed in or survived         % victims killed in Gatwaro St. 
the genocide ?  <50%  >50%  Total 
  Group 1  Group 2 
 
Killed  number  4.609  4.590  9.199 
  percent  83.1  89.6  86.2 
 
Survived  number  939  530  1.469 
  percent  16.9  10.4  13.8 
 
Total  number  5.548  5.120  10.668 
  percent  100  100 
 
Chi-Square Tests of the equality of survival chances 
  Value  df  Asymptotic  Exact  Exact 
      Sign.  Sign.  Sign. 
      (2-sided)  (2-sided)  (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  96.898  1  .000 
Continuity Correction  96.345  1  .000 
Likelihood Ratio  98.256  1  .000 
Fisher’s exact test        .000  .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association  96.889  1  .000 
Number of valid cases  10.668 
 
 
We find that Tutsi from sectors with few victims (in %) killed in the Gatwaro Stadium had a 
higher overall survival chance. From the first group, 16.9% survived the genocide, whereas 
only 10.4% from the second group survived. This difference is statistically highly significant, 
as shown by the test statistics.  In general, we do not find a higher survival percentage in the 
sectors whose population sought refuge in ‘Nyamagumba‘ and fought the Interahamwe there. 
We found 677 Tutsi who went to Nyamagumba, from two sectors in particular, Kibingo and 
Rukaragara. Both belong to our second group, but the survival percentage was much higher 
for Kibingo sector (22.3%) compared to Rukaragara (6.5%). Although few Tutsi from these 
two sectors went to the Gatwaro Stadium, we cannot draw general conclusions on the 
question whether fighting the Interhamwe increased one’s survival chances. It seems that only 
escaping to Zaire or hiding really improved one’s chances. From this, one can derive a 
behavioral guideline for persons targetted for extermination in the future : do not go where 





Table 6.5: Occupations of the victims of Mabanza 
Name of occupation  Number of victims  % of victims 
Pupil  2.486  26,8 
Farmer  4.774  51,5 
Teacher  97  1 
Administrator  59  0,5 
Businessman  41  0,4 
Driver  20  0,2 
Construction worker  21  0,2 
Soldier  22  0,2 
Doctor/nurse  16  0,17 
Pastor/nun  9  0,1 
Technician  3  0,03 
Lawyer  3  0,03 
All other occupations  35  0,3 
Unknown occupation  1.671  18 
Total  9.257  100 
 
Table 6.5 gives an overview of the occupations of the victims of Mabanza commune. Because 
of the presence of a secondary school, this commune had more professionals compared to 






Figure 3: Distribution of killing through time, cases with known dates =3427* 
Days of April 1994
























*  About 150 Tutsi from Mabanza whose date of death is known, died after April 30th, 1994; they are not 
included in the graph. In total, we have 3566 people in Mabanza whose date of death is known. Almost half 
of all the Tutsi from Mabanza commune of which we have the date, died either on April 13th or on April 17th. 
The former marks the attack on Nyamagumba and the latter the killing in the Parish of Kibuye and the 
Gatwaro stadium. It is more likely that the dates of the victims who died in these major massacres are known 
compared to victims who were killed in their houses, in the woods or on the hills : we have the dates of 50% 
of the victims killed in either Parish, Stadium or Nyamagumba, compared to 30% of the victims killed outside 
these major massacres. The major massacres are thus overrepresented in Figure 3, but the bias is not very 
large. It is not the case that off-farm occupations are over represented in the dates. 
 
 
Figure 4 : Age specific survival chances in Mabanza commune 
AGE GROUP






























Since death and survival are discrete events in statistical and demographic analysis, we can 
perform a logistical regression analysis with a survival dummy variable ‘0’ for death and ‘1’ for 
survived. We use age, sex and sector of residence as explanatory variables. The binary choice 
model, which is underlying the logistical regression, is derived in appendix 1. In the present 
estimation , ‘the event occurring ‘ is the survival of a person during the genocide in Mabanza 
commune. The following variables were included in the regression : Age, Age squared, Sex, 
Sex*Age interaction, occupational dummy and sector dummies except for the sectors Mukura 
and Ngoma (very few cases) and sector Buhinga which was used as the base-line. The number 
of people included in the regression is 8.289 (number for which we have complete 
information).  
 
  Table 7 : Regression results, survival dummy is dependent variable 
 
Explanatory Variables                                B       S.E.  Sig 
AGE  .0442 **  .0096  .0000   
AGE
2  -.0011 **  .0001  .0000   
SEX                                                       .2312       .1447  .1101   
AGE*SEX  .0110 **  .0051  .0311   
OFF-FARM  .6589 **  .1391  .0000 
SECTOR dummies 
GACACA  1.2155 **  .1675  .0000   
GIHARA                                              -.3640           .2211  .0997   
GITWA  .8141 **  .1847  .0000   
KIBIRIRA  1.6166 **  .1517  .0000   
KIGEYO                                             -.1128            .1743  .5177   
KIBINGO  1.2329 **  .1462  .0000   
MUSHUBATI  .7198 **  .1559  .0000   
NYAGATOVU  .5897 **  .1590  .0000   
NYARUGENGE                                 -.0324                             .2207   .8833   
RUBENGERA  .4016 **  .1956  .0401   
RUKARAGATA                                  -.0456           .2334  .8452   
CONSTANT  -2.9649 **  .1924  .0000 
n=8.298 
the effects are robust for other specifications of the logistical regression 





Since the interpretation of the results requires some knowledge of the logistical procedure, we 
shall concentrate on the essential findings. All the variables, except the sex variable and four 
sector dummies, are significant (Sig < 0,05) meaning that these variables have a separate and 
statistically relevant link with our dependent variable, survival during the genocide. 
 
The effects of the age variable is not linear, but quadratic. This means that a victim’s 
probability to survive the genocide increases with age at low levels of age, reaches a maximum 
at the age of 20 (0.0442 / (2*0.0011)) and decreases again at high levels of age. Women in general 
did not have a higher survival chance, but older women did. Tutsi having a non-farming occupation 
had a higher survival chance than farmers and pupils. The latter result is puzzling and 
interesting at the same time. Were they better informed then poorer people and chose the flee 
earlier ? Where they physically more able to flee ? Did they have more cash to pay off 
Interahamwe ? This regression exercise cannot give answers to these questions. All it can do is 
show that one’s occupation did influence one’s survival chance in Mabanza. Compared to 






5. THE DISTRIBUTION OF KILLING THROUGH TIME AND SPACE: 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND RESULTS 
 
 
5.1. Dealing with missing data 
 
Since the number of dates of death known by commune is highly unequal, it is possible that 
Figure 1 offers a biased perspective of the distribution of killing through time. The bias occurs 
if the killings in the communes where we have little data differs substantially from the 
communes where we have a lot of data. The shape of the curve in Figure 1 suggests that most 
of the Tutsi of Kibuye were killed in the first weeks of April 1994. Further investigation has to 
show whether missing data change this shape. 
 
In order to present a graph for the entire sample, we have to devise an estimation procedure 
that corrects for the lack of data in some of the communes. For the communes of Bwakira, 
Kivumu, Mabanza, Mwendo, Rutsiro and Rwamatamu, a simple and straightforward  
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estimation procedure was used. We consider the victims of which the dates are known as a 
representative sample of all the victims of that commune. This means we apply a weighing 
procedure where the weight by commune is adjusted according to the number of dates known 
for that commune. For example, for Mwendo commune, where we have almost half of the 
dates, each date is weighted with 2,2. This procedure thus assumes that the distribution of the 
dates of killing of the victims of which the date is known is representative for all the victims 
residing in that commune. 
  
For the communes Gishyita and Gisovu a slightly different procedure was used for three 
reasons: firstly, we noticed that the date of death of the victims living in these communes 
varied a lot according to the place where they died. In these communes, it made a difference 
whether one was able to take refuge in the hills of Bisesero or not. The victims taking refuge 
in Bisesero died later than the victims who were killed in other places. Secondly, especially in 
Gishyita commune, where many Tutsi lived, the number of cases in which the date is known 
is larger for the victims who did NOT die in Bisesero. This means that if we apply the same 
weight for the whole commune of Gishyita, the estimation for the victims from Bisesero is 
biased. We would then proceed as if the distribution of the dates of death of the victims at 
Bisesero is the same as the distribution of the victims who died at other places
12. Thirdly, since 
it is important to know how many people died in Bisesero and when they died, we undertake a 
separate estimation for Bisesero. For these three reasons, the dates of victims from Gishyita 
and Gisovu communes are weighted according to whether they died in Bisesero or not
13.  
 
For the commune of Gitesi, not only the date of death is not registered in the IBUKA 
database, but also the place is not registered for more than 50% of the victims. At this point, 
the IBUKA database is unreliable. For Gitesi commune therefore, another weighing 





                                                 
12  The Tutsi living in Gishyita commune were not only killed in the hills of Bisesero, but also in the Mugonera 
Hospital, in the Catholic Church of Mubuga and in other places throughout the commune. 
13  When I use Bisesero, I mean the hills (plural) in Bisesero sector where the Tutsi of Gishyita, Gisovu, Gitesi 





Table 8: Different weighing Factors 
 
One weighing factor  two weighing factors  three weighing factors 
  Bwakira  Gishyita    Gitesi  
  Kivumu  Gisovu 
  Mabanza      depending on when and 
  Mwendo  depending on    where they died  
  Rutsiro  whether they died  -  Somewhere in the commune 
Rwamatamu  in Bisesero or not    between April 15 and 19  
    -  in Bisesero 
    -  in all other places 
 
 
To repeat, in order to estimate the distribution of killing through time, we need to weigh the victims with known 
dates of death. Depending on the commune the weighing factors differ. For most communes we only need one 
weighing factor, namely one that multiplies each victim with known date to arrive at the total number of victims 
in that commune. 
 
For Gishyita and Gisovu, we use two weighing factors, depending on the place of death, namely in Bisesero or 
not in Bisesero. We therefor needed to determine first how many people died in Bisesero, otherwise we cannot use 
reliable weighing factors. The same is true for Gitesi commune. Since dates are lacking for Gitesi, we needed to 
determine first  the number of victims at several places in the commune before applying weighing factors in the 
time distribution. This was done with the help of the re-coded data in appendix 2. 
 
In order to keep the text readable, the estimation procedure for Bisesero is presented in the appendix 3. In order 
to do our estimation for Bisesero, we also had to look at the number of Tutsi killed in Kibuye town. The latter 
helps us to calculate the number for Bisesero. Without the figure for Bisesero (which is of course also an 
estimation) one cannot determine the weights needed for the distribution through time. In order to calculate the 
number of Tutsi who died in Bisesero, a number of assumptions had to be made. 
 
On the basis of the IBUKA data, my own re-coding of the Mabanza and Gitesi data and a 
number of assumptions specified in the appendix 3, I estimate the number of Tutsi who died 
in Bisesero at 13.000, of which 6.800 from Gishyita, 1.333 from Gisovu, 3.700 from Gitesi, 






5.2. Estimation results by day for Kibuye Prefecture 
 
 
With the 13.000 estimate for Bisesero and the weighing procedure for each commune and for 
Bisesero, we can present a table and a graph of the distribution of killing through time in 
Kibuye prefecture. The method namely considers the victims in Bisesero of which we have 
the dates of death as a representative sample of all the victims of Bisesero. To calculate these 
victims is important because the Tutsi at Bisesero, on average, died later than the other Tutsi. 
This accordingly gives you another distribution through time. Since we only have the dates of 
2.500 victims who died in the hills of Bisesero, these people are giving a weighing factor 5,2 to 
arrive at 13.000 (my best estimate).  
 
According to the IBUKA data, 340 people died before April 6. From other sources, it is 
known that several people were killed in the first months of 1994 in different attacks, but 340 
in five days seems to be a high number. We were not able to verify this information, but it 
may very well be that enumerators registered 'April 1' instead of 'May 1', meaning that we may 
be dealing with registration errors. We find support for this reasoning when we notice that the 
number of people registered as killed in the first week of May is very low. When one adds the 
figures of April 1 to the figures for May 1 (and April 2-5 to May 2-5) we may get more correct 
figures for killing in the first week of May. We realize the importance of knowing exactly how 
many people were killed before April 6 for the study of the genocidal process, but from a 
statistical point of view, these numbers make no big difference. That is why we decided to 
include them in the presentation 
 
Measured in numbers of people killed per day, the genocide in Kibuye reached its peak in the 
middle of April. 75% of Kibuye’s Tutsi killed during the genocide were killed in the first few 
weeks. After 50 days (by the end of May), the genocide was almost completed in Kibuye, 
leaving 59.050 dead. This makes a daily average of 1.200 Tutsi killed. The first few weeks 
however show a much larger number of people killed per day. Between April 7
th and April 
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st, about 3.000 Tutsi (75% of 59.050 divided by 15 days) were killed on average every day 
with April 13
th as peak showing an estimated 6.408 (10.8% of 59.050) people killed that day. A 
day later an estimated 6.206 people were killed. The most deadly weekend during the genocide 
in Kibuye Prefecture was probably April 16 and 17 with 4.800 and 5.300 people killed each 
day respectively.  
 





Table 9 : Victims of genocide in Kibuye Prefecture (including Bisesero) per day 
 
Date   Number of Tutsi   Weighted number  Percentage  Cumulative 
  killed that day of  of Tutsi killed  of Tutsi  percentage 
  which date is known  that day (applying  killed that day 
    ‘best estimate’) 
April 1  134  134  0,2  0,6 
April 2  7  7  0,0  0,7 
April 3  7  7  0,0  0,7 
April 4  175  175  0,3  1,1 
April 5  17  17  0,0  1,2 
April 6  11  20  0,0  1,2 
April 7  63  160  0,3  1,5 
April 8  193  445  0,8  2,2 
April 9  379  1.133  1,9  4,2 
April 10  655  1.503  2,5  6,7 
April 11  952  2.135  3,5  10,1 
April 12  2.398  4.238  7,1  17,2 
April 13  3.683  6.408  10,8  28,1 
April 14  3.492  6.206  10,5  38,6 
April 15  2.468  4.416  7,4  46,0 
April 16  2.525  4.839  8,2  54,2 
April 17  1.629  5.296  9,0  63,2 
April 18  1.194  3.488  5,9  69,1 
April 19  312  1.392  2,3  71,4 
April 20  681  1.506  2,5  73,9 
April 21  146  300  0,5  74,4 
April 22  100  208  0,4  74,8 
April 23  84  163  0,3  75,1 
April 24  203  772  1,2  76,3 
April 25  207  501  0,9  77,2 
April 26  76  142  0,2  77,4 
April 27  43  93  0,2  77,6 
April 28  870  1.099  1,9  79,5 
April 29  59  101  0,2  79,7 












Table 9 : Continued 
 
Date   Number of Tutsi   Weighted number  Percentage  Cumulative 
  killed that day of  of Tutsi killed  of Tutsi  percentage 
  which date is known  that day (applying  killed that day 
    ‘best estimate’) 
May 1  67  212  0,4  80,4 
May 2  136  547  0,9  81,3 
May 3  39  146  0,3  81,6 
May 4  32  86  0,1  81,7 
May 5  51  173  0,3  82,0 
May 6  22  62  0,1  82,1 
May 7  9  37  0,1  82,1 
May 8  36  157  0,3  82,4 
May 9  28  66  0,1  82,5 
May 10  103  342  0,6  83,1 
May 11  37  100  0,2  83,3 
May 12  57  205  0,4  83,7 
May 13  782  3.654  6,2  89,9 
May 14  227  1.029  1,7  91,6 
May 15  203  902  1,6  93,2 
May 16  69  231  0,4  93,6 
May 17  24  111  0,2  93,8 
May 18  53  209  0,4  94,2 
May 19  20  54  0,1  94,2 
May 20  97  361  0,6  94,8 
May 21  26  93  0,2  95,0 
May 22  14  40  0,1  95,1 
May 23  14  52  0,1  95,2 
May 24  13  44  0,1  95,3 
May 25  71  291  0,5  95,8 
May 26  21  69  0,1  95,9 
May 27  0  0  0  95,9 
May 28  33  93  0,2  96,1 
May 29  15  46  0,1  96,2 
May 30  34  131  0,2  96,4 
May 31  13  65  0,1  96,5 
All of June  771  2.120  3,5  100,0 
  and later 









Figure 5 : Victims of Genocide in Kibuye Prefecture 













































From the data, we learn that killing started immediately, especially in the communes of 
Rutsiro, Mabanza, Rwamatamu and Gishyita.. The graphs that were published in the 
Nominative Dictionary of IBUKA are approximately correct, but do not do apply the 
weighing factors. The main difference between the graphs in the dictionary and the present 
graphs is that the former underrepresent the number of Tutsi killed on May 13
th. While figure 
5 clearly shows the first two weeks of the genocide in Kibuye as the period in which most 
Tutsi were killed, it also details two other devastating days, namely April 28
th and May 13
th. 
The latter date is known in the survivor community as the date on which Interahamwe from 
all over Rwanda assembled in Bisesero to kill the Tutsi there who succeed in resisting the 
genocide. For several weeks, the Tutsi at Bisesero mounted a formidable resistance against the 
forces of genocide. Using the steep hills, gathering and throwing stones and implementing a 
method of strategic fighting (Kwivunga sha), they succeed in staying alive. Against attackers 
with overwhelming firepower, they had no chance anymore. Figure 6 in particular shows the 
extra-ordinary death path of the Bisesero Tutsi. The second peak, April 28 and 29 are the days 








Figure 6 : Victims of Genocide at Bisesero 












































6. EXTRAPOLATION FOR RWANDA  
 
 
Extrapolating the estimation results for Kibuye and combining this with numbers of killed 
Tutsi put forward in the literature, we can make an approximation of the killing in the entire 
country. I want to stress that the following table is only a tentative approximation and should 
not be regarded as a careful count. I used my own calculations for Kibuye and calculated all 
the other figures from the Human Rights Watch publication "Leave none to tell the story ". I 
added the numbers in that publication for the major massacres that occurred during the 
indicated days in Gikongoro and in Butare. The figures are only rough estimations. I also took 
the 500.000 number from HRW as the estimated number of victims. From census data we 
know that Kibuye, Gikongoro and Butare taken together have about half of the Tutsi 
population before the genocide. Since it was difficult to get estimates for massacres in the 








Table 10 : Estimation (by extrapolation) of killing over time* 
 
  Kibuye  Butare  Gikongoro  3 pref.  Rwanda** 
April 6-10  3.000    10.000  13.000  25.000 
April 11-14  20.000    25.000  45.000  87.000 
April 15-18  20.000  20.000  20.000  60.000  115.000 
April 19-22  2.000  35.000  15.000  52.000  100.000 
April 23-26  2.000  35.000    37.000  70.000 
April 27-30  2.000  10.000    12.000  23.000 
 
Total April   49.000  100.000  70.000  219.000  420.000 
May-June  11.000  20.000  10.000  41.000  80.000 
Total  60.000  120.000  80.000  260.000  500.000 
*  I repeat that this table should not be read as if I do not think that there were no killings in Butare Prefecture 
before April 15. I am only interested in gross figures, not in exact calculations here.  
**  Extrapolation is done starting from the sum of the three prefectures and using the HRW estimate of 500.000 
as a baseline. I rounded off to thousands, avoiding the use of hundreds.  
 
 
Table 10 suggests that between April 15
th and April 18
th, more than 25.000 were killed every day 
in Rwanda. This can be traced back to the major massacres in that period : For Kibuye in the 
Gatwaro Stadium and the Parish of Kibuye, for Butare in Cyahinda church complex in the 
commune of Nyakizu and for Gikongoro in Kibeho church. The figure of 25.000 is my 
approximation of the average number of people killed between April 11
th and April 22
nd : 














7. ANALYSIS OF THE WEAPONS USED IN THE KILLING PROCESS 
 
 
7.1 Focus on age 
 
Figure 7 : Murdered with a firearm 
Realized probability by age 
 
AGE






































The dots in figure 7 present the percentage of victims of each age that were killed by a firearm. 
Statistical software allows to draw a line (best fitted quadratic expression) through the cloud of 
these dots. A clear pattern emerges: few children and elderly people were killed by firearms 
and (relatively) many young adults. 20 to 25% of all victims in their early twenties were killed 
by firearms whereas for victims in their late fifties the figure was 10%. In a regression analysis 
(table 12) we will see that this age-effect is statistically significant. 
 
 
7.2 A word on occupation and gender 
 
From the IBUKA data file, we learn that 30.843 of the registered victims were farmers, 15.494 
were pupils, 2.003 had an occupation outside farming and 10.710 victims were registered with 
unknown occupation. These figures confirm the basic characteristic of Rwandan society in 
general and in Kibuye in specific, namely the fact that it is a very rural society. Only a small 
minority of the working population did not farm. This is basically true for Hutu as well as for 
Tutsi. The former may have been more present in public administration and the latter more in 




past, Tutsi used to be more involved in cattle breeding than Hutu, in the early nineties, there 
was no outspoken ethnic specialization in either agriculture or cattle breeding anymore
14. 
Depending on wealth, Hutu as well as Tutsi held cattle and grew crops. The IBUKA data file 
does not mention the landholdings or the number of cattle of the victims and makes only a 
distinction between farming and non-farming.
15 In table 11, I show the occupations of the 
victims, together with the weapons, that were used to kill the victims. I only use data on 
victims for whom the date of death, the occupation and the weapon is known. The pupils are 
also taken apart because this category is determined by age, which we already treated in the 
previous section. From a total of 21.293 victims for whom we have information on 
occupations, 772 (5% of the adult victim population) had a non-farming occupation. We 
notice that 30% of them were killed with a firearm. This percentage is significantly higher than 
that for farmers and pupils. 
 
Table 11 : Occupations and weapons used 
 
Occupation  number  killed by firearm  % 
Farmers  13.589  1902  14 
Non-farmers  772  231  30 
Pupils  6.932  1039  15 
 
More men than women were killed during the genocide in Kibuye, 30.528 men and 28.471 
women (with 51 unknown) according to the IBUKA file. As far as the weapons are 
concerned, the difference between men and women is less outspoken compared to the 
differences by the age and occupations. Slightly more men than women (in absolute figures as 







                                                 
14  Historically, it may be more correct to say that people involved in cattle breeding were, over time, 
considered Tutsi. I refer to the literature on this important and complex topic, e.g. Newbury (1988), De 
Lame (1996). 
15  More research is needed to investigate in what respect real or perceived ethnic labor specialization and 
inequalities in landholdings and cattle played a role in the genocide. Sources are f.e. A. Desforges (1999), 
P.Uvin (1998), C.André and J.-Ph. Platteau (1998). 
16   In the regression (table 12) gender appears to be significant in interaction with other variables.  
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7.3. Inequality until death ? A regression analysis of the weapons used to kill 
 
The scholarly community involved in genocide research agrees on the use of traditional 
weapons as the main killing instruments in the Rwandan genocide. Less agreement is reached 
on the importance of firearms during the genocide. In this section, I shall test statistically 
whether or not firearms were used indiscriminately of the victim’s person. In the previous 
sections, we discussed five variables that each may have had an effect on the weapon used to 
kill an individual during the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture. These variables were the date of 
death, the commune of residence, the gender of a person, the occupation and the age of this 
person. A statistical procedure, logistical regression analysis, allows one to trace the specific 
effect of each of these variables on the weapon that was used to kill the person in question. 
The logistic analysis is performed for those cases in which the dates of death were known, 
namely 43% of entire sample. We assign the value ‘0’ in the event the victim was killed with a 
traditional weapon and the value ‘1’in the event the victim was killed with a firearm. The latter 
variable is either a bullet or a grenade. Our fifth variable is now a binary variable, (0 or 1) 
which is necessary to perform a logistical regression. The question we want to answer here is 
the following: are the independent variables able to explain the way in which the victim was 
killed, namely with a firearm or with a traditional weapon? The binary choice model is derived 
in appendix 1. In the database, we have 20.419 victims between April 6 and June 30 for whom 
we have complete information, meaning no missing data for any of the variables to be used in 
the regression analysis. It first needs to be said that I did not have a lot of choice on the 
question which variables to include in the regression. Apart from the mentioned variables, I 
also have the name of the place of death of the victim. I could not include the place of death 
since the data contain hundreds of places where people were killed and these places, as we 
have seen e arlier in the paper, were not coded. We did include dummies for communes. 
Remember that we left out Rutsiro and Gitesi communes because of lack of data. Bwakira 
commune is used as base-line commune and the effects of other communes are thus fixed 
effects relative to Bwakira commune. 
17 The following variables were included in the analysis: 
age, age squared, sex (female=1), sex*age interaction, occupational dummy (off-farm work is 
1), number of days after April 6, number of days after April 6 squared, sex*number of days 




                                                 




Table 12 : Regression results, dependent variable weapon used 
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Variable  B  S.E.  Sig 
AGE  .0345 **  .0041  .0000 
AGE
2  -.0005 **  .0000  .0000 
SEX  -.1342  .1285  .2963 
SEX*AGE  -.0067 **  .0021  .0016 
OFF-FARM  .5200 **  .0801  .0000 
DAYS after April 6  .1147 **  .0069  .0000 
DAYS after April 6 sq.  -.0014 **  .0001  .0000 
SEX*DAYS after April 6   .0491 **  .0135  .0003 
SEX*DAYS after April 6 sq.  -.0015  **  .0003  .0000 
COMMUNE dummies 
GISOVU  1.2435 **  .1753  .0000 
GISHYATA  1.2841 **  .1642  .0000 
KIVUMU  1.5782 **  .1660  .0000 
MABANZA  3.2234 **  .1604  .0000 
MWENDO  .6327 **  .1884  .0008 
RWAMATAMU  2.4434 **  .1576  .0000 
CONSTANT  -4.9339 **  .1838  .0000 
n= 20.419 
the effects are robust for other specifications of the logistical regression 
** significant at the 5% level 
 
The probability of the victim in Kibuye Prefecture to be killed by a traditional weapon or a 
firearm depended on the person’s age, his occupation, the place of residence before the 
genocide, on the number of days the after April 6 the person was killed and on interaction 
effects of these variables with the sex. All the variables determine the ‘choice’ the killer made 
between a traditional arm or a firearm.  
 
The effects of the age and days-after variables are not linear, but quadratic. This means that a 
victim’s probability to be killed with a firearm increases with age at low levels of age; it reaches 
a maximum at age 34,5 (0.0345 /(2*0.0005)) and decreases again at high levels of age. This is 
also true for the days-after-April-6 variable : the probability to be killed with a firearm 
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  Gitesi and Rutsiro communes are left out because of lack of data.  
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increases as the days move away from April 6, but decreases again towards the end of the 
genocide. The significance of the results on age and number of days after April 6 in fact 
confirms that middle-aged people (20 to 40 years of age) were more likely to be killed with 
firearms and that the genocide reached its most intensive period (meaning here the period in 
which the probability to be killed by a firearm was highest) after a few weeks.  
 
Since the sex variable by itself is not significant, women in general did not have a smaller chance to be 
killed by a firearm. The significance of sex (or gender for that matter) reveals itself  in 
combination with other variables (see below). The only variable capturing (part of) the socio-
economic situation of the victim is the occupation variable. In the regression, victims with a 
non-farming occupation (a small minority in Rwanda) have the value ‘ 1’ on the occupation 
dummy. The regression shows that non-farmers had a higher probability to be killed with a 
firearm compared to farmers and pupils. 
 
Both the age and days-after-April-6 effects interact with the sex variable. A woman's 
probability to be killed by a firearm, compared to a man, decreases with her age (sex-age 
interaction negative and significant). For the days-after-April-6 variable, there is an additional 
positive effect for women at the beginning of the genocide and a negative effect towards the 
end of the genocide. This means that the probability of women to be killed by a firearm was 
higher, compared to men, a few weeks into the genocide (the period that I label 'the most 
intensive period'), and lower, compared to men, towards the end of the genocide. Although all 
these effects are significant (that is the reason why I present them), one should not 
overestimate their magnitude. The effects, especially the magnitude of the squared effects, are 
small. The effects of the communes of residence are also significant and on top of that they 
are very strong. This means that the probability of being killed by a firearm was high for 
residents of Rwamatamu and Mabanza communes compared to Bwakira. The regression does 
not tell  the reasons why these communal dummies are significant and strong. Apart from 
Mabanza (see below), this is a question open for research. The effects are not due to the 
enumerators, since 15 to 20 enumerators were doing the data collection in one commune and 






In section four, I researched Mabanza commune in more detail. The reason why the 
probability of a Tutsi from Mabanza commune to be killed by a firearm was the highest in the 
entire prefecture was that many victims from Mabanza were killed in the Gatwaro Stadium. In 
that stadium, the perpetrators of genocide installed machineguns in the tribunes and fired at 
the crowd who were locked in the Stadium. Reasons for high prevalence of killing with 
firearms in a commune might be the size of the local stock of firearms, the presence of army-
units in a commune, the participation of militia armed with firearms from another prefecture, 
to name but a few. A reason for the high prevalence of killings with traditional weapons in a 
commune might be the distribution of machetes to the local population. Detailed on-site 
investigations are necessary to confirm or refute this hypothesis. From the statistics however, 





On a more general level, the results of the logistical regression show the organized character 
of the genocide. If age, occupation, commune of residence, the number of days after April 6
th 
and the sex (interaction) variables all prove significant to explain the weapon used, then 
genocide was all but a random process. Indeed, one can read this regression analysis as 
statistical evidence of the organized character of the genocide in Kibuye prefecture. 
 
As reasons why young Tutsi men who were working in the modern sector of the economy 
had a higher probability of being killed with bullets then other victims, we can only find one: 
in a number of cases, killers had to economize on bullets and thus used firearms only against 
the people in the village who could mount resistance. These people in turn were most likely 
young men aged 20 to 40 with a respected status in the commune or sector. That may have 
been one reason why they were killed by bullets. But again, the reasons behind this statistically 
significant effect cannot be derived from the analysis, but have to be found by other means. 
The present result only tells us that there is a significant effect and gives us some insight in the 
genocide, but cannot give waterproof explanations.  
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   There are not many sources with which to compare the results from this logistical regression. An 
observation from the previously mentioned French officer, Lt. Colonel Stabenreth, does give some 
indications “…From his investigations, he established that the Tutsi refugees who had sought shelter at the stadium had been 
attacked by soldiers and militia who had shot until they had run out of ammunition…”. As I said before, most of the 
refugees at Gatwaro Stadium came from Mabanza commune and the officer concludes from his 
investigation that the Tutsi in the stadium were killed with firearms. My statistical result also corresponds to 
the observations of eyewitness Doctor Blam who heard the intervention of firearms and grenades during 
the massacre in the Stadium.  
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8.1. The content of reports and letters written by the prefect 
 
In this section of the paper, I use the words of the perpetrators of genocide without giving 
much comment. I quote from the reports in order to show what they themselves wrote about 
the crime. In the next section, I discuss the use of the words in italics. The following reports 
and letters were obtained from Human Rights Watch : (own numbering of the document in 
brackets) 
 
-  A detailed report by the Prefect of Kibuye of the day to day events in all the communes 
between April 6 and April 10 dated on April 11. (k1) 
-  The report of the meeting of the security committee of Kibuye Prefecture on April 11, 
1994 (k2) 
-  A letter of the Préfet to all the Burgomasters concerning the self-defense program of the 
population, on April 30
th, 1994 (k3) 
-  A letter from the Préfet of Kibuye Prefecture to the Minister of the Interior and 
Communal Development, on May 5, 1994 (k4) 
-  A letter from the Minister of Interior and Communal Development to the military 
commander in Gisenyi asking to send troops to Kibuye Prefecture to support an 
operation in the sector of Bisesero, Commune of Gishyita, dated June 18, 1994 (k5) 
-  A  undated letter addressed to the Minster of Interior and Communal Development 
concerning the management of Gisovu Commune. (k6) 
 
In his first report during the genocide (k1) the Préfet of Kibuye , Dr. Clément Kayishema, 
gives a detailed overview of the situation in the communes and of his measures taken during 
the first days of the genocide. I quote from this report
20: On April 7, Kibuye was scheduled to 
receive a visit by the Special representative of the UN, Dr Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, but he 
did not come because of the events in the country. The same day the Préfet reports rumors of 
interethnic clashes, especially in the communes of Gishyita, Rwamatamu and Mabanza. On the 
night of April 7 to April 8, the Préfet reports trouble in all the communes of Kibuye Prefecture, 
but he adds that it are still  rumors and that the local officials are trying to calm down the 
population. One rumor for example is that a group of people is going to cut the telephone lines 
of the Mugonero hospital in Gishyita commune. In Kivumu commune, the Préfet reports that 
two children of a Tutsi family are killed and the women wounded. On April 8, the Préfet 
                                                 





reports that Hutu in Gitesi commune want to organize security walks at night. The Préfet also 
reports the decisions of the security committee of the prefecture on the morning of April 8.  The 
names of the members of this security committee meeting are mentioned in the document.  
 
They decide that 
-  the fuel of the Petrorwanda fuel station is reserved for security,  
-  public meetings are forbidden until further notice,  
-  the permission to circulate for hotel personnel and visitors should be analyzed case by case 
and  
-  a number of vehicles are allocated to certain communes and communal police. 
 
The report continues the overview of the events in the communes in the afternoon of April 8. 
Several refugees from Kayove arrive in Rutsiro and Mabanza communes. There is a rumor that 
the Tutsi of Bisesero are going to attack the Hutu of Bisesero. Tutsi would hide arms at the 
Hospital. In the night of April 8 to 9, about 300 refugees are signaled in the communal Bureau 
of Rwamatamu together with their cows and goats. On April 9, the security committee of the 
prefecture meets again and decides that 
 
-  no shooting between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. 
-  authorization needed from the Burgomaster to travel to another commune 
-  closing of the markets near the Kivu Lake  
-  Allocate 500.000 Rwandan Francs from account 90.002 at the Commercial Bank of 
Rwanda to buy urgently needed fuel.  
 
The report continues with the overview of the situation in the communes with a great deal of 
attention to Gishyita commune. The Burgomaster of that commune asks for urgent 
intervention of the gendarmes. The Tutsi of Mabanza commune have gathered at the 
communal bureau. In Mwendo commune, 11 criminals are arrested but taken to Kibuye 
center because the prosecutor of Birambo does not dare to do investigations. The 
burgomaster of Gisovu reports he has found two motorbikes and that some people are 
carrying guns. Refugees from Muko commune in Gikongoro arrive in Mwendo commune.  
 
On April 10, the Préfet reports that the Hutu of Gishyita are discouraged because the Tutsi seem 
to have firearms. In Mabanza commune, the houses of the Tutsi are burning in several sectors 
and almost all Tutsi have gathered in at the communal bureau. A schoolteacher was killed by a 
grenade. In Mwendo commune, several houses of Tutsi are burning in Gashari sector but the 
gendarmes have intervened. Tension is rising and the refugees from Muko are relocated to the  
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primary school. In Rutsiro commune one has started to kill the cows and two people have 
died. The UNAMIR soldiers have left Kibuye on April 10 and relocated at Butare. The only 
expatriates who remain in Kibuye are religious people and some health workers. A list with 
their names is attached to the report. 
 
Document (k2) is a short listing of all events on April 11. It relates the presence of 1000 
refugees in Mwendo commune, mainly originating from Muko commune and 3000 refugees in 
Mabanza commune who are threatened by people from Rutsiro commune. There is a rumor that 
gendarmes are going to rob the Commercial Bank of Rwanda in Kibuye (Gitesi commune). 
The council tries to find solutions for the short supply of fuel and vehicles. They buy fuel, the 
Préfet decided to empty the MRND youth fund. The communes have requested additional 
policemen, firearms and ammunition, but the Préfet reports that it is  up to the communes 
themselves to provide this. The measures of the April 9 meeting are repeated adding that a 
mobilization campaign in the framework of pacification will be undertaken. After this meeting, which 
lasted from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., the members of the committee formed two groups to visit 
several communes. This activity was labeled a ‘visit to the field’ in the report (k2).  
 
Document (k3) informs the burgomasters of the decision by the government of Rwanda to 
install a civilian self-defense program. The government wants the population to organize controls, 
set up roadblocks and look for infiltration by the Inkotanyi. In that respect, the burgomasters 
should recruit persons who will receive training from military reserve personnel. These 
persons should be physically and morally apt, of good conduct and with a certain credibility in 
the eyes of the population.  
 
Letter (k4) addresses the security report for the April 11 to April 30 period to the Interior 
Minister
21. The Préfet, author of this letter, states that that period was characterized by inter-
ethnic killings in almost the whole prefecture, a massive displacement of people and livestock, 
looting and destruction of houses and of public buildings. He continues that calm is gradually 
returning from April 25 onwards and that people take up their normal activities again. There 
is, the Préfet writes, a small area of insecurity in the Bisesero area bordering Gishyita and Gisovu 
communes. In the remainder of the letter, the Préfet reports seven disquieting facts among 
which, the absence of funds, the climate of vengeance between people and the arguments over 
the distribution of looted goods, abandoned fields and houses by the population.  
 
                                                 




Document (k5) is a letter addressed to the military commander in Gisenyi by the minister of 
the interior. By governmental decision, the minister orders the commander to supply troops to 
Kibuye for a search operation in Bisesero (in French “operation de ratissage”). This operation 
should be terminated at the latest by June 20
 .  
 
Document (k6) is a complaint against the burgomaster of Gisovu commune, Ndimbati who is 
accused of mismanagement of his commune. The letter is not dated but features a receive stamp 
dated July 8, 1994. The burgomaster is accused of looting furniture, raiding cattle, stealing 
money from the local bank, stealing 73 metal sheets from a medical center and killing 7 
persons including 2 soldiers. These seven persons were residents of Gishyita commune and as 
a result of the killing, there is increasing tension between the people of Gisovu and Gishyita 
communes. That is why the author of the letter proposes to replace the burgomaster.  
 
 
8.2. The (un)reported facts and the use of population statistics 
 
As in Nazi-Germany, the word ‘genocide’ was never used to describe the killings. The Préfet 
used ‘the war‘, ‘inter-ethnic rivalries’, ‘security measures’ to describe the acts of genocide. 
When the Préfet gives an overview of the ‘events’ in Kibuye in the first week of the genocide 
(April 6- 10) (k1) and in his report of April 11 (k2), he mentions the burning of houses, the 
displacement of people, the presence of refugees and sometimes he also reports the killing of 
a few people. Compared to the statistics presented in the first part of this paper, the figures of 
murdered people in the reports of the Préfet are ridiculous. One person killed in Kivumu, 3 
persons killed in Mabanza, he writes…whereas in fact more than 5000 Tutsi were killed at the 
end of the first week. 
 
The Préfets’ statement that on April 7 especially the communes of Mabanza, Rwamatamu and 
Gishyata were ‘hit by interethnic clashes ‘ seem to correspond, at least as far as the date and 
the communes are concerned (the description of the ongoing events is something else), with 
the early killings in these communes derived from the IBUKA data file. This means that from 
two independent sources, we can state that the genocide started in all communes on April 7, 
but was especially fast in the three communes mentioned. These reports from the Préfet of 
Kibuye, Dr. Kayishema Clément, are official documents of a leading official in Rwanda. The 
Préfet was the highest authority in his prefecture but did not have close contact with the 
population when compared to the burgomasters. Notwithstanding the language used by the 
Préfet, we can derive from his reports that the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture started 
immediately after the death of president Habyarimana. The population of Kibuye did not wait  
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one day but started killing on April 7. The speed of the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture is 
incredibly high, as documented by the IBUKA figures, which is an indication that many Hutu 
joined the killing campaign.  Thus the reports of the Préfet only give a glimpse of the real 
facts. It was virtually impossible for the Préfet to make a day to day head count of all the 
victims in his prefecture, but as Alison Desforges writes  
 
  “Administrative officials recorded changes in the population extremely carefully before the genocide, nothing births, 
deaths, and movement into and out of the commune on a monthly as well as a quarterly basis. With this data, 
officials knew how many Tutsi, whether male or female, adult or child, lived in each administrative unit, 
information useful in any attempt to eliminate them. Prefect Kayishema was so concerned about the accuracy of 
this data that he took time in early May to review census data submitted by burgomasters for the last quarter of 
1993. He found errors in at least two of the reports, that of Mabanza, which recorded the increase in female 
Tutsi as fifty-two instead of fifty-three, and that of Rwamatamu where an error of seven was made in accounting 
for the male Tutsi population and an error of six was made in recording that of female Tutsi.“
22 
 
This makes it clear that population statistics in Kibuye Prefecture and especially the accurate 
reporting system of demographic changes that existed in Rwanda before the genocide became 
a deadly tool in the hands of the prefect. Desforges writes that during the genocide, 
administrators gave orders to register all displaced persons immediately. (p. 240). She also 
refers to documents where the burgomaster of Bwakira commune asked councilors to submit 
a list of household heads who had died, the number of people in the household killed and the 
number who had fled (p. 240-241). The use of statistics in the pursuit of genocide is not 
unique to Rwanda. In a recent paper, W. Seltzer shows the intricate involvement of statistics 
and statistical systems in the planning and advancement of the genocide against the Jews of 
Europe in Nazi-Germany, Poland, France, the Netherlands and Norway
23. What is highly 
disturbing in the Rwandan case is the fact that the international community did not take action 
against the registration of ethnicity on the identity cards of Rwandans when this could have 
saved thousands of lives. According to Desforges, influential donors overlooked the 
systematic discrimination against Tutsi before the genocide and did not insist on the 
elimination of ethnic affiliation on the cards that served as death warrants for many Tutsi in 
1994 (p. 17) Indeed, as the statistics helped the Préfet to pursue genocide as accurately as 
possible, the identity cards (one of the visible outputs of a statistical system) helped the 
Interahamwe to sort out Tutsi from a crowd of people.  
 
                                                 
22  Desforges, A., Leave none to tell the story, Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 239. 
23  Seltzer, W., Population Statistics, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials, Population and Development 




The Préfet did not only trace Tutsi, he organized the massacres himself and chose a 
euphemistic language to talk about them. I did not find a word about the massacre in Gatwaro 
Stadium for example. However, this does not mean that we should totally discredit his reports. 
When, in document (k4) the Préfet writes that “calm” gradually returned from April 25 
onwards, he means that most Tutsi from Kibuye had been killed by then. From the end of 
April, the Préfet tried to restore ‘normality’ in the prefecture. As if nothing had happened, 
children had to go back to school and adults back to work. 
 
The group of Tutsi that defended themselves in Bisesero where among the few Tutsi that 
were still alive. The Préfet describes this is his letter (k4) as a “small area of insecurity”. 
Survivors of the massacres at Bisesero told African Rights researchers they have seen the 
Préfet several times at Bisesero. He was considered one of the leading organizers of the 
genocide
24. The Préfet, together with Obed Ruzindana (rich businessmen), Alfred Musema 
(director of the tea factory in Gisovu) and the burgomasters of Gisovu and Gishyata drove 




The answer of the Préfet that the communes themselves have to provide firearms and 
ammunition can be understood in the context of the national policy of self-sufficiency.
26
 This 
policy did not only mean that each household should produce their own food, but also that 
each commune should take care of itself, making that each prefecture and in the end Rwanda 
can care for itself. As it was national policy before the genocide that Rwanda should solve its 
own problems, or find Rwandan solutions for its problems, the genocide itself was interpreted 
as a Rwandan solution to its own problem. Every cell, sector, commune or prefecture should 
solve its own problem; that is how political leaders tried to transmit their messages to local 
officials. Only when resistance was too great and local officials could not manage the situation, 
the higher level would intervene. This was the case in Bisesero where the burgomaster of 
Gisovu sent someone with his car to Cyangugu to call John Yusufu Munyakazi to Bisesero 
because the interahamwe from Bisesero could not ‘do the job‘ by themselves. It was with the 
help of this relentless mass murderer that the Tutsi of Bisesero lost the unequal battle. 
(African Rights pp. 29-30). 
                                                 
24  Resisting Genocide, p.18 and 28. I do not have access to testimonies by survivors in the course of judicial 
procedures at the International Court in Arusha, where the Préfet Clément Kayishema is currently 
imprisoned. Such testimonies could shed light on the exact role of the Préfet during the genocide in 
Kibuye. 
25  Ibidem, and p. 51. 
26   I refer to another paper of mine where I discuss the development and peasant ideology of the Habyarimana 






In this paper, I have presented a statistical analysis of the genocide in Kibuye Prefecture, 
Rwanda. I used the data file collected by IBUKA and assumed that the data in this file are 
(fairly) reliable. I discussed the numerous data problems of this file. For two communes, 
Mabanza and Gitesi, I re-coded the data on victims to use them for statistical purposes and 
also computerized data on survivors. From the regression analysis, I derive that middle aged 
Tutsi had a better survival chance then the very young and the very old, especially when they 
did not join the crowd at the Gatwaro Stadium. Fleeing gave the highest probability to survive 
the onslaught. The effects of several sector dummies in the regression are very significant, 
indicating that one’s survival chance indeed depended on the sector of residence. The reason 
for this is that the Tutsi population of half of the sectors of Mabanza went to the Stadium 
whereas the Tutsi of the other sectors did not (or not so much) go to the Stadium. 
 
In order to calculate the distribution of killing through time, I first had to estimate the number 
of people killed in the hills of Bisesero. This was only possible with the help of some 
assumptions to overcome gaps in the data file, especially for the commune of Gitesi. My best 
estimate for the number of Tutsi killed in the hills of Bisesero is 13.000. Using this number, I 
then calculated the number of Tutsi killed every day in the entire prefecture. The results from 
this calculation confirm what the scholarly community already knows, namely that the speed 
of the genocide was incredibly high. 75% of the Tutsi of Kibuye were already killed by the 22
nd  
of April, meaning a daily average of 3000 for the first two weeks of the genocide. And this is 
only for one prefecture.  
 
The paper also features a statistical analysis of the weapons used in the genocide. Half of 
Kibuye’s murdered Tutsi population was murdered with a machete, one in six with a club and 
one in six with a firearm. The place of residence before the genocide, the age and gender of 
the victim and the victim’s occupation all proved statistically significant in a regression 
determining the weapon (a binary variable) used to kill a particular victim. Combined with the 
speed of the killing, these results could only have been obtained, we believe, with broad 
participation of Hutu peasants in the genocide. As Minna Schrag, a former prosecutor with 
the International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia, observed at a 1997 conference on the 
use of quantitative data and analysis “data can help us tell the story of the crime “. (from W. 
Seltzer, p. 543). From the data, I conclude that speed, accuracy and resistance are the 





Appendix 1 : the binary choice model 
 
The binary choice model is derived as follows
27 : 
The probability of having y = 1 instead of zero can be written as 
  { } ( ) Pr , ob y G xk = = 1 b   (1.1) 
where G is a functional form containing the vectors x and b. 
Usually, the functional form is restricted to 
  ( ) ( ) G x F x k k ,b b = ¢    (1.2) 
where F is a cumulative distribution function 
 
It is possible to derive a binary choice model using a latent variable presentation of the model 
  ￿ + =
*
k k kx y e b   (1.3) 
where y* is an unobserved latent variable and e symmetrically distributed with zero mean and 
cumulative distribution function F(e).  What we observe is a dummy variable y, a realization of 
a binomial process, defined by 
y if y and y otherwise = > =
* 1 0 0  
therefore 
 



















0 Pr 1 Pr
  (1.4) 
The specific functional form of F depends on the assumptions that one makes concerning the 
distribution of e.  In case of the binary logit model, we assume that e follows a logistic 
distribution.  This distribution is similar to the standard normal distribution but instead of a 
variance of 1 it has a variance of p
2/3. 
 
                                                 
27  We follow the approach taken in Liao, T.F, Interpreting probability models, Quantitative applications in the 
social sciences series, Sage publications, 1994.  
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In that case 
  ( ) ( ) ￿
+
￿
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1 Pr   (1.5) 
 
The model in (1.5) is the binary logit model, it represents the probability of the event 
occurring (y=1). In the two estimations presented in this paper, 'the event occurring' is the 




Appendix 2 : Death and survival in Gitesi commune 
 
Gitesi commune, which is Kibuye’s ‘urban’ commune, had a numerous Tutsi population 
before the genocide. Unfortunately, the quality of the data collection on the genocide was 
weak. It is this lack of good data that made me visit Gitesi commune in October 2000. I 
wanted to find out more about the genocide in that commune. Together with a re-coding of 
the data, the visit to Gitesi commune yielded the following information: 
 
-  From April 6
th till April 11
th, the large majority of the Gitesi Tutsi stayed in their homes
28. 
They did not gather by the thousands in front of the communal office as did the Tutsi 
from Mabanza. This explains why, after April 11, the Tutsi of Gitesi were killed at a large 
number of places throughout the entire commune, more dispersed then the Tutsi of 
Mabanza commune.  
-  The dispersion also explains why fewer dates on which the killings happened were 
recorded. Members of the same household fled in different directions and did not know 
about the fate of their household members.  
-  The burgomaster apparently did not actively pursue the genocide, neither did he oppose it. 
He behaved more as a bystander. This may give an additional explanation of the 
dispersion of the Tutsi from Gitesi, at least in the first few days of the genocide. 
-  A number of Tutsi of Gitesi came to Kibuye town center from April 12 onwards; many of 
them however were killed in other places throughout the commune.  
 
As I indicated at the beginning of the paper, the quality of the data for Gitesi commune is 
poor. Re-coding is only a worthwhile undertaking if it gives the researcher additional and new 
information. Looking at the registration books for Gitesi commune, I decided that re-coding 
would be worthwhile for half of the sectors, namely the sectors Burunga, Buye, Bwishyura, 
                                                 




Gitarama, Kayenzi and Rurangwe. The results are presented hereafter. The procedure is thus 
the same as for Mabanza commune, except that for the latter, we re-coded all the sectors.  
 
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for Gitesi commune 
  6 sectors  full* 
Total number of inhabitants registered in the 1991 census  30.950  61.900 
Total number in 1994 (1991 figure* (1.03)
2)   32.835  65.670 
Total number of Tutsi registered in new database                           6.269                      12.538 
Total number of victims   5.425  10.850 
Total number of survivors  832  1664 
Number of Tutsi without entry   12  24 
Percentage of 1994 Tutsi killed  16.5%  16.5% 
Percentage of Tutsi in new database killed   86,5%  86.5% 
Percentage of Tutsi in new database survived  13,2%  13,2% 
* This extrapolates the findings of the six re-coded sectors to the entire commune (12 sectors)  (* with 2). The 
latter column does not give exact figures thus. 
 
 
The re-coded sectors make up half of the population of Gitesi commune. From the data, we 
learn that about 16,5% of the population in these sectors was killed, totaling 5.425 victims 
from a population of 33.000 just before the genocide. These victims represent 86,5% of the 
Tutsi population in the six re-coded sectors, leaving 832 survivors. Using the information for 
the re-coded sectors to give approximate figures for the entire commune, we estimate that 














Table 14 : Places where the Tutsi residents of Gitesi commune were killed 
 
Name or location                               Number of victims           Entire  % of victims 
                                                          (6 re-coded communes)    commune 
In the cell of residence                                     1.149                         2.298  21,1 
In another cell within the sector                         175                            350    3,2 
In another sector within the commune                21                              42  0,3 
In the Gatwaro Stadium                                     359                            718  6,6 
In Bisesero
29                                                       180                            360  3,3 
In Parish of Kibuye                                            233                            466  4,3 
In Karongi (sector Gitwa)                                  443                             886  8,1 
In the mountains                                              1.591                         3.182  29,3 
In the Kivu Lake                                                  13                              26  0,2 
At any another place                                             45                             90  0,8 
At an unknown place                                        1.216                        2.432  22,4 
Total                                                                 5.425                      10.850  100 
Valid total                                                         4.209                        8.418  77,5 
 
Table 15 : Places of refuge* 
Tutsi from the re-coded sectors  sought refuge 
Burunga  in Kibuye ville (Parish et Stadium) 
Buye  at Karongi hill, in the mountains 
Bwishyura  in Kibuye ville, Lac Kivu, Karongi 
Gitarama  in the mountains 
Kayenzi  in the mountains 
Rurangwe  in the mountains 
From the other sectors 
Bubazi  in the mountains 
Gasura  Karongi, Nyamishaba secondary school 
Gitesi  in the mountains 
Kagabiro  Paroisse Mubuga, in the mountains 
Mbogo  in the mountains 
Rubazo  Paroisse Mubuga, in the mountains 
* source : author’s interviews in Gitesi commune 
                                                 




Since in one out of four and a half cases the place of the killing was unknown and one out of 
three places is coded as "in the mountains", it means that we have no details on the place of 
death of half of the victims in our database (see table 14). Even after re-coding, we cannot fill 
the gap left by the enumerators from Gitesi commune. Only interviews can bring additional 
information. The persons interviewed said that a large part of the Tutsi population of Gitesi 
commune was dispersed throughout the commune. This was their explanation why they used 
the broad category "in the mountains", just as in the IBUKA file. They would add that a 
considerable number (they did not know how much) first sought refuge at Karongi hill and 
afterwards continued to Bisesero.  
 
Figure 8 : Distribution of killing through time, n=948 cases 
 
Days of April 1994

























Since all Tutsi killed on April 17
th of whom this date is known, come from sector Bwishyura 
and since all Tutsi killed on April 26
th  of whom that date is known, come from sector 
Gitarama, figure 8 may overestimate the number of people that died on these two dates when 
we take all sectors into account. Since April 17
th is the day of the massacre in the Parish of 












Figure 9 : Residence-specific survival chances in Gitesi commune 
 
Sector of residence

























Legend : Burunga 2, Buye 3, Bwishyura 4, Gitarama 6, Kayenzi 9, Rurangwe 12. 
 
Figure 9 shows that sector Buye was the most deadly sector among the re-coded sectors  and 
that considerable between-sector variation existed in Gitesi commune. This observation 
corresponds to the statement of a person I interviewed in Gitesi. The interviewee said that in 
Buye practically all Tutsi were killed. However the person failed to give reasons f or the 
between-sector variation in survival chances. 
 





























For figure 10, I could only use data for sectors 2, 4 and 6 since enumerators in the other 
sectors did not register the age of the survivors. That is also the reason why I did not perform 




Appendix 3 : estimation procedure of killing through time 
 
Gishyita and Gisovu communes 
 
My assumptions are not random, but based on the available information in the data file.  For 
Gishyita commune, I can trace 5.800 people (out of 11.273) who died in the hills of Bisesero, 
because the place of death is mentioned in the data file. This figure is the ‘sure’ estimate for 
Gishyita. I also trace 4.000 people who did not die in the hills of Bisesero. This leaves about 
1.473 Tutsi from Gishyita who may or may not have died at Bisesero. Their place of death is 
unknown or unclear in the database. Since a lot of people died in the hills of Bisesero, it is 
more likely that the exact place is not known, in any case more likely than when they were 
killed in Mugonera hospital or in another place in the commune. I therefore assume that 1.000 
out of these 1.473 (two thirds) were also killed in the hills of Bisesero. This gives an estimated 
6.800 Tutsi from Gishyita, meaning three out of five Tutsi from Gishyita, were killed at 
Bisesero. For Gisovu commune, I find at least 1.000 people (out of 3003) who died in 
Bisesero (the place is indicated in the data file) and 1.500 who died in other places
30.
 As in the 
case of Gishyita, I assume that 333 out of the remaining 503 (two thirds) also died in the hills 
of Bisesero. This makes 1.333 Tutsi of Gisovu, meaning 44% of its killed Tutsi population, 




commune  total number   not killed in   killed in  in % 
  of Tutsi killed  Bisesero   Bisesero 
    sure  assumed  sure  assumed 
Gishyita  11.272  4.000  4.473  5.800  6.800  60 









                                                 
30  About 500 of Gisovu’s Tutsi population was killed at Kiziga Hill, commune of Rwamatamu.  
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Gitesi and Mabanza communes 
 
From interviews in the commune, we know that a considerable number of Tutsi from Gitesi 
commune managed to take refuge in Bisesero. African Rights writes that Tutsi who survived 
several massacres in Kibuye and Gitesi arrived in Bisesero
31. The Tutsi from Gitesi commune 
more specifically survived or escaped from massacres at the Gatwaro Stadium, the Parish of 
Kibuye and the Home of St.-Jean. From the IBUKA file however, one can derive that the 
majority of Tutsi who were killed at these places had their residence in Mabanza commune. I 
refer to table 17 for the figures of Mabanza and Gitesi commune.  
 
Table 17 : Commune of residence* 
 
Place of death   Mabanza  Gitesi 
Gatwaro Stadium  3.359  718 
In Bisesero   300  360 
In the mountains  177  3.182 
Other specified places  4.233  4.158 
Unknown  1.188  2.432 
 
Total number of victims  9.257  10.850 
*  Source IBUKA data file. In the text, I discuss the data problems for the commune of Gitesi. We note that for 
Gitesi commune, the unknown places were added to "in the mountains" in the IBUKA file, a procedure that 
I did not use in the re-coding of the data. The figures for Gitesi commune are extrapolations from a re-coded 
file of 6 sectors. 
 
 
The observation from the data file that the majority of Tutsi killed in Kibuye center came 
from Mabanza commune is corroborated by interviews with survivors and the eye-witness 
account of a German expatriate doctor who stayed in Kibuye center until his evacuation in 
mid-May. He recalls that survivors told him that thousands of Tutsi from Mabanza commune 
gathered at the communal office. During two days at the communal office the Burgomaster 
told them not to leave the compound. Tutsi from other communes of Kibuye arrived and 
then the Burgomaster told them that he had received the order to send everybody to Kibuye 
                                                 




town. On Wednesday 13




Doctor W. Blam, working for the German Development Cooperation writes that (from April 
11 and April 12 onwards): 
  “the next few days, waves of refugees, most of them from Mabanza, arrived and by Friday 
(15
th), more than 10.000 were concentrated in the town of Kibuye. More than 5000 in the 
Gatwaro Football Stadium next to the hospital (where he was residing), several thousand at the 
Catholic parish and an undetermined number with friends or parents and already at the isles 
close to the Kivu Lac.”
33  
 
Doctor Blam also writes that these refugees were telling horrible stories of terrible massacres 
against groups of refugees in Rutsiro commune (p.108). The figures of (at least) 10.000 
refugees on the whole and 5.000 in Gatwaro Stadium corresponds with other figures, gathered 
by military officers. African Rights quotes two French officers who did on-site investigations 
some time after their arrival  
 
  “Colonel Patrick Sartre told Reuters that at least 4.500 Tutsis, including women and children, 
were slaughtered in the Kibuye Stadium on April 16 and 17. He calculated that about twelve 
thousand Tutsi had been murdered in those two days, at the church, in the stadium and in the 
surrounding countryside. Lt. Colonel Eric de Stabenrath told Keith Richburg of The 
Washington Post that he found 4.300 bodies piled on top of each other in Kibuye’s church and 
seven to nine thousand more bodies in a sports stadium. From his investigations, he established 
that the Tutsi refugees who had sought shelter at the stadium had been attacked by soldiers and 
militia who had shot until they had run out of ammunition. He concluded that between eighty 
and ninety-five percent of the Tutsi population had been destroyed in this area.”
34 
 
Exactly how many Tutsi were killed in the Gatwaro stadium is difficult to say. Doctor Blam 
says he saw more than 5.000 refugees before the massacre, Colonel Patrick told Reuters 4.500 
people were slaughtered in the stadium, Lt. Colonel Stabenrath counted seven to nine 
thousand bodies and the IBUKA dictionary project traced 4.179 names of victims who died in 
the stadium. The latter figure is an underestimation since we do not know the exact place of 
death of a considerable number of victims.  
                                                 
32   Rwanda, death, despair and defiance, African Rights, 1995, pp.395-396 
33  Blam, W. Genocide as ‘modern’ political instrument, original text published in German in H. Schürings 
(ed.) Ein Volk verlässt sein Land. Krieg und Völkermord in Ruanda, Köln, 1994. Author’s translation from 
the French version published in Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme, Karthala, 1997, p.108. The 
French text was checked and authorized by the author, Doctor W. Blam. 
34  African Rights, Rwanda : Death, Despair and Defiance, 1994, p. 289.repeated in the 1995 edition p.416 and 
p. 424.  
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In contrast to the Tutsi from Mabanza commune, a considerable number of Tutsi from Gitesi 
commune were not trapped in the town center. The exact number is difficult to determine 
given the unspecified place ‘in the mountains’ in the data file. This does not mean that ALL 
the Gitesi refugees reached Bisesero. Gitesi indeed is an adjacent commune to Gishyita, but 
Bisesero sector in Gishyita commune borders Gisovu commune and not Gitesi commune. 
Moreover, with all the killing throughout the communes, a large number of Tutsi were killed 
on the roads, in their houses and while hiding with friends. From my re-coding of half of the 
Gitesi sectors, we learn that (when we extrapolate for the whole commune) one out of three 
Tutsi from Gitesi were killed in either Bisesero (3.3%) or "in the mountains" (29.3%), while 
8.1% were killed in Karongi and for 22.4%, the place is unknown. Because of the lack of 
reliable data, we have to make two arbitrary assumptions: we assume that two out of three 
people who died "in the mountains" reached Bisesero and that one out of two people whose 
place of death is unknown also reached Bisesero. This gives a total of 3,3 + 19,5 + 11,2 = 
34% of the Gitesi victims, meaning about one third or 3.700 (out of 10.850) Tutsi from Gitesi. 
The assumptions of course are the weakest part of this estimation. 
35 
 
The distribution over time of the remaining 7.150 (not killed in Bisesero) victims of Gitesi 
commune is also based on my re-coded data file and observations from eyewitnesses. From 
the 948 people killed from Gitesi of which we have the date, 642 (67%) were killed between 
April 15
th and April 19
th, with 400 (62% of 642) on the 17
th, the day of the massacre in the 
parish of Kibuye. This, I agree, very limited source of information, combined with 
information from interviews (African Rights, Doctor Blam and author’s interviews in Gitesi), 
allow us to make the following (rudimentary) assumptions: Since the major massacres in that 
commune took place from April 15 to April 19, I assume that 4.300 (60% of 7.150) died 
during these days, with a concentration on April 16, 17 and 18. Because of lack of accurate 
data, I distributed these 4.500 victims as follows: Friday 15
th (250), Saturday 16




th (1.000) and Tuesday 19
th (800). As a consequence, I assume also 
that the remaining 2.850 (=10.850-3.700-4.300) Tutsi from Gitesi commune followed the 
distribution of the entire prefecture. This is plausible given the evidence that Tutsis who were 
hiding in the hills were hunted down throughout the territory of the entire prefecture and 
throughout the three months of the genocide. All weighing factors for each of the dates are 
thus augmented, proportionally to the number of people who died on that date, to account for 
                                                 
35   These assumptions are indeed arbitrary, but table 11 provides at least some support for it. 
36  2000 is only 46% of 4300, meaning less than the 62% represented by the 400 victims out of 642 which died 
between April 15 and 19. These 400 however almost all come from one of the re-coded sectors. Taking the 
whole commune into account, this sector represents probably less then 62% of the people killed on April 
17th. We also refer to our discussion of figures 6 and 4. In order to avoid overestimation for April 17th, I 




these remaining 2.850 victims. The data file also shows a small number of Tutsi from 
Mabanza who died in Bisesero. Because Mabanza commune is not bordering Bisesero sector 
in Gishyita commune, I estimate that only a very small percentage of the ‘unknown’ in the 
Mabanza file reached Bisesero. 
 
As for Rwamatamu commune is concerned, most Tutsi were killed in the commune itself and 
early in the genocide. Few people managed to escape to Bisesero. In the database, I found 
about 9.000 Tutsi from Rwamatamu who were not killed at Bisesero. This leaves about 1.000 
refugees who could have reached Bisesero. The presence of Tutsi from Rwamatamu at 
Bisesero is corroborated by interviews with survivors
37. The result is presented in table 18. 
 
Since only the commune of Mabanza and half of the commune of Gitesi were re-coded, I 
decided to stay with the overall figure of 59.050 victims found by IBUKA as a baseline for the 
estimation over time, thus not accounting for the (small) differences in number of victims I 
found for both coummunes after the re-coding.  
 
Table 18 : Number of Tutsi killed in Bisesero 
 
Commune of residence  Minimum or  Probable or  Maximum 
  ‘sure’ estimate  ‘best’ estimate  estimate 
Gishyita  5.800  6.800  7.300 
Gisovu   1.000  1.333  1.500 
Gitesi
38  600  3.700  4.000 
Rwamatamu   400  700  1.000 
Mabanza  300  400  800 
Total number  8.100  12.933  14.600 
                                                 
37  Resisting Genocide, African Rights, p. 11. 
38  Again, I want to stress that the difference between the minimum estimate and the best estimate for Gitesi 
commune is due to the lack of data in the IBUKA file. It should be clear by now that I want to stay as close 
to the data as possible. When the data do not tell me where the victim died, or only died ‘in the mountains’, 
I cannot be sure that they died in Bisesero. That is where assumptions play a role. I do not think that 8100 
people were killed at Bisesero, the 8100 is the bare minimum which we can be sure of. On the same token, 
we can almost be sure that more Tutsi from Gitesi died in Bisesero then Tutsi registered as such in the data 
file. Statistics give you tools that allow you to go beyond 100% certainty. My best estimate on the basis of 
what we know of the genocide in Kibuye prefecture and Bisesero is 13.000. This is the figure that I believe 
is the closest I can get to reality. 13.000 is the figure that I can reasonably defend, given the information in 
the database plus some necessary assumptions to fill the gaps of the database. Some mistakes in the data or 
some adjustments in the number of people from Gitesi commune who died in Bisesero (for example 
because one is not sure whether they died on Karongi hill or on Bisesero hill) would not make a big change 
to the 13.000 figure. Taking a 10 percent error into account, one can argue that between 11.700 and 14.300 
Tutsi were killed in Bisesero between April 6, 1994 and July 1, 1994.  
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The 13.000 figure is my best estimation, based on the IBUKA file together with my re-coding 
and some assumptions for Gishyita, Gisovu and Rwamatamu communes that are pretty close 
to reality and two assumptions for Gitesi commune that may be less realistic. Changing the 
assumptions however would not make a big difference. My minimum estimate for the number 
of Tutsi at Bisesero is therefore 8.100 (which is surely lower than the real number) and my 
maximum estimate is 14.600. The minimum is based on the number of victims in the IBUKA 
file where the place is mentioned in the data file
39.  
 
The 13.000 estimate is lower than figures in other publications, but the author believes it is a 
good estimate because it is based on large-scale data collection
40. African Rights, for example, 
writes that 50.000 people were killed in Bisesero. This is an overestimation. Given the total 
number of victims in Kibuye Prefecture (59.050) found by IBUKA, the figure of Tutsi killed 
in Bisesero given in the African Rights publication (50.000) is too high. Granted that the 
IBUKA figure may be an underestimation and that the IBUKA figure only contains Tutsi 
living in Kibuye before the genocide, the African Rights figure of 50.000 for Bisesero alone 
remains very high nonetheless. This is because it would mean that either 10% of the 
population of the entire prefecture (or two thirds of all the Tutsi from Kibuye) had gathered at 
Bisesero or either that a large number of Tutsi from Gitarama, Gisenyi, Gikongoro or 
Cyangugu Prefectures had found refuge in Bisesero. Both hypothesis seem highly unlikely 
given the sheer impossibility to travel long distances for a number of people large enough to 










                                                 
39  If future research shows that most Tutsi from Gitesi did not die ‘in the mountains’ as is mentioned in the 
IBUKA file, but were killed in other major massacres in Gitesi commune, the figure of 13.000 Tutsi killed 
in Bisesero has to be revised downward (with one or two thousand) and the figure for the Parish has to be 
revised upward. On the other hand, if future research shows that more than 3.700 Tutsi from Gitesi 
commune reached Bisesero, my estimate for Bisesero has to be revised upward (with one or two thousand). 
40  Provided of course that the IBUKA dictionary research project did not fail to find a lot of victims, which I 
assume not to be the case here. If future research shows that the dictionary is incomplete, the estimate has 
to be revised upward. 
41  I do not think my estimation of the number of victims in the Hills of Bisesero diminishes the great value of 
the interviews published in ‘Resisting Genocide’. Indeed, both the horrible suffering and human power of 
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